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ABSTRACT
We present Verifi2, a visual analytic system to support the inves-
tigation of misinformation on social media. Various models and
studies have emerged from multiple disciplines to detect or un-
derstand the effects of misinformation. However, there is still a
lack of intuitive and accessible tools that help social media users
distinguish misinformation from verified news. Verifi2 uses state-
of-the-art computational methods to highlight linguistic, network,
and image features that can distinguish suspicious news accounts.
By exploring news on a source and document level in Verifi2, users
can interact with the complex dimensions that characterize mis-
information and contrast how real and suspicious news outlets
differ on these dimensions. To evaluate Verifi2, we conduct inter-
views with experts in digital media, communications, education,
and psychology who study misinformation. Our interviews high-
light the complexity of the problem of combating misinformation
and show promising potential for Verifi2 as an educational tool on
misinformation.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Human-centered computing → User interface design; So-
cial media; Visual analytics.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The rise of misinformation online has a far-reaching impact on the
lives of individuals and on our society as a whole. Researchers and
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practitioners from multiple disciplines including political science,
psychology and computer science are grappling with the effects of
misinformation and devising means to combat it [14, 44, 52, 53, 63].
Although hardly a new phenomenon, both anecdotal evidence
and systematic studies that emerged recently have demonstrated
real consequences of misinformation on people’s attitudes and
actions [2, 46]. There are multiple factors contributing to the wide-
spread prevalence of misinformation online. On the content gen-
eration end, misleading or fabricated content can be created by
actors with malicious intent. In addition, the spread of such mis-
information can be aggravated by social bots. On the receiving
end, cognitive biases, including confirmation bias, that humans ex-
hibit and the echo chamber effect on social media platforms make
individuals more susceptible to misinformation.
Social media platforms have become a place for many to consume
news. A Pew Research survey on “Social Media Use in 2018” [4]
estimates a majority of Americans use Facebook (68%) and YouTube
(73%). In fact, 88% younger adults (between the age of 18 and 29)
indicate that they visit any form of social media daily. However,
despite being social media savvy, younger adults are alarmingly
vulnerable when it comes to determining the quality of information
online. According to the study by the Stanford History Education
Group, the ability of younger generations ranging from middle
school to college students that grew up with the internet and social
media in judging the credibility of information online is bleak [63].
The abundance of online information is a double-edged sword -
“[it] can either make us smarter and better informed or more ignorant
and narrow-minded”. The authors of the report further emphasized
that the outcome “depends on our awareness of the problem and our
educational response to it”.
Addressing the problem ofmisinformation requires raising aware-
ness of a complex and diverse set of factors not always visible in
a piece of news itself, but in its contextual information. To this
aim, we propose Verifi2, a visual analytic system that enables users
to explore news in an informed way by presenting a variety of
factors that contribute to its veracity, including the source’s usage
of language, social interactions, and topical focus. The design of
Verifi2 is informed by recent studies on misinformation [32, 63],
computational results on features contributing to the identification
of misinformation on Twitter [61], and empirical results from user
experiments [5].
Our work makes the following contributions:
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• Verifi2 is one of the first visual interfaces that present fea-
tures shown to separate real vs. suspicious news [61], thus
raising awareness of multiple features that can inform the
evaluation of news account veracity.
• To help users better study the social interaction of differ-
ent news sources, Verifi2 introduces a new social network
visualization that simultaneously presents accounts’ direct
interactions and their topical similarities.
• Verifi2 leverages state-of-the-art computational methods to
support the investigation of misinformation by enabling
the comparison of how real and suspicious news accounts
differ on language use, social network connections, entity
mentions, and image postings.
• We provide usage scenarios illustrating how Verifi2 supports
reasoning about misinformation on Twitter. We also provide
feedback from experts in education/library science, psychol-
ogy, and communication studies as they discuss how they
envision using such system within their work on battling
misinformation and the issues they foresee.
2 PRODUCTION AND IDENTIFICATION OF
MISINFORMATION
Misinformation and its many related concepts (disinformation, ma-
linformation, falsehoods, propaganda, etc.) have become a topic of
great interest due to its effect on political and societal processes of
countries around the world in recent years [29, 40, 50]. However, it
is hardly a new phenomenon. At various stages in history, societies
have dealt with propaganda and misinformation coming from vari-
ous sources including governments, influential individuals, main-
stream news media, and more recently, social media platforms [12].
It has been shown that misinformation indeed has some agenda
setting power with respect to partisan or non-partisan mainstream
news accounts or can even change political outcomes [13, 59]. Mis-
information is a broad and loosely defined concept and it consists
of various types of news with different goals and intents. Some
of the identified types of misinformation include satire, parody,
fabricated news, propaganda, click-baits, and advertisement-driven
news [57, 58]. The common feature among these categories is that
misinformation resembles the look and feel of real news in form
and style but not in accuracy, legitimacy, and credibility [32, 58].
In addition to the concept of misinformation, there is a broader
body of research on news bias and framing defined as “to select
some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient
in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular
problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or
treatment recommendation” [17]. By studying how misinforma-
tion is produced and how audiences believe it, as well as carefully
surveying different means of news framing, we can have a strong
motivation and guidance on how to address misinformation from a
visual analytic perspective.
In this paper, we approach misinformation from three different
perspectives. First, we discuss existing research on how misinfor-
mation is produced. More specifically, how news outlets and indi-
viduals use different methods to alter existing news or to fabricate
completely new and false information. Next, we discuss what makes
audiences believe and trust misinformation. Finally, we review over
existing methods for identifying, detecting, and combating misin-
formation.
2.1 Production of misinformation:
How and why misinformation is created is a complex topic, and
studying it requires careful consideration of the type and intent of
misinformation outlets, as well as different strategies they use to
create and propagate “effective” articles. Several intents and rea-
sons can be noted on why misinformation exists. These reasons and
intents include economic (e.g., generating revenue through inter-
net advertisements and clicks), ideological (e.g., partisan accounts
focusing on ideology rather than truth), or political factors (e.g.,
government produced propaganda, meddling with other countries
political processes) [11, 57, 58]. Driven by these intents, certain
news outlets use different strategies to produce and diffuse misin-
formation.
News media that produce misinformation often follow topics
and agendas of larger mainstream partisan news media, but in some
instances, they have the potential to set the agenda for mainstream
news accounts [59]. Furthermore, they have a tendency to have nar-
row focuses on specific types of information that can manipulate
specific populations. Often, we can observe extreme ideological bi-
ases towards specific political parties, figures, or ideologies [11, 55].
Some outlets take advantage of the psychological climate of audi-
ences by focusing on fearful topics or inciting anger and outrage
in audiences [11]. Moreover, misinformation accounts tend to take
advantage of cognitive framing of the audience by focusing on spe-
cific moral visions of certain groups of people adhere to [11, 18, 30].
They also filter information to focus on specific subsets of news,
often focusing on specific political figures or places [8, 9].
Misinformation is not always present just in text. Biases and
news framing are often presented in images rather than text to con-
vey messages [21]. The power of images is that they can contain
implicit visual propositioning [7]. Images have been used to convey
racial stereotypes and are powerful tools to embed ideological mes-
sages [38]. Different means of visual and framing have been used to
depict differences in political candidates from different parties [22].
For example, misinformation outlets use images by taking photos
out of context, adding text and messages to the images, and altering
them digitally [36].
Another important aspect in the production and dissemination
of misinformation, specifically in the age of social media, are so-
cial bots. Social bots are automatic accounts that impersonate real
outlets and manipulate information in social media. They are some-
times harmless or useful, but are often created to deceive and ma-
nipulate users [19]. Social bots can like, share, connect, and produce
misinformation [32], they have the potential to amplify the spread
ofmisinformation, and exploit audiences cognitive biases [31]. It has
been shown that bots are active in the early stages in the spread of
misinformation, they target influential users and accounts through
shares and likes, and might disguise their geographic locations [52].
2.2 Why and how we believe misinformation
Misinformation is falsified and fabricated information taking the
form of real news. Equally as important to how misinformation
outlets slant or fabricate news is produced, is to understand why
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and how people believe certain falsified information or take part in
propagating the information. There are various social and psycho-
logical factors that effect the way we accept or reject information.
It has been shown that collective means and social pressure affect
our decision-making processes. Hence, we are likely to believe a
news article to be true if our social group accepts it [16, 31, 54].
Prior exposure to a statement also increases the likelihood that
individuals believe it to be true [44]. These factors form echo cham-
bers in our real and digital societies and effect our ability to judge
information accurately. These echo chambers are also amplified by
algorithmically controlled news outlets that expose users to news
they are more likely to interact with [12, 20, 56]. As individuals,
we are also affected by confirmation bias and are more receptive
of views that confirm our prior beliefs [31, 42]. In contrast, the
ability to think analytically has a positive effect on the ability to
differentiate misinformation from real news [45]. The uncertainty
of misinformation and the ability to qualitatively and quantitatively
analyze misinformation also has some effect on individual’s ability
to distinguish misinformation [5].
2.3 Battling misinformation
In order to combat the spread and influence of misinformation, we
need to improve the structures and methods of curtailing misin-
formation to decrease audiences initial exposure, but we also need
to empower individuals with the knowledge and tools to to better
evaluate the veracity of the information [32].
The gravity of the issue has brought many researchers in com-
putation to develop novel methods of detecting and identifying
misinformation of various kinds. Many methods focus on detecting
individual stories and articles. A number of fact-checking websites
and organizations heavily rely on humans to detect misinformation
[1, 3]. Researchers have developed a model to detect click-baits by
comparing the stance of a headline in comparison to the body [14].
By focusing on sarcasm and satirical cues researchers were able to
create a model that identifies satirical misinformation [49]. Images
have also been used to distinguish misinformation on Twitter. It
has been shown that both meta user sharing patterns and auto-
matic classification of images can be used to identify fake images
[24]. Using previously known rumors, classification models have
been created to detect rumor propagation on social media in the
early stages [53, 64]. Even though detecting misinformation on the
early stages is extremely valuable, it has been noted that enabling
individuals to verify the veracity and authenticity of sources might
be more valuable [32].
Social media data has been used in visualizations related to vari-
ous domains including planning and policy, emergency response,
and event exploration. [28, 34, 35] . Several visualization based ap-
plications have been developed that allow users to explore news
on social media. Zubiaga et al. developed TweetGathering, a web-
based dashboard designed for journalists to easily contextualize
news-related tweets. TweetGathering automatically ranks news-
worthy and trending tweets using confidence intervals derived
from an SVM classifiers and uses entity extraction, several tweet
features and statistics to allow users to curate and understand news
on social media. [65]. Marcus et al. designed twitInfo, an appli-
cation that combines streaming social media data several models
including with sentiment analysis, automatic peak detection, and
a geographic visualizations to allow users to study long-running
events [37]. Diakopoulos and colleagues developed Seriously Rapid
Source Review (SRSR) to assist journalists to find and evaluate
sources of event-related news [15]. Using a classification model,
SRSR categorizes sources to organizations, journalist/bloggers, and
ordinary individuals. Furthermore, they use several features de-
rived directly from Twitter as well as named entity extractions to
allow journalists to understand the context and credibility of news
sources. Even though these applications do not focus on misinfor-
mation, their lessons learned from dealing with social media are
important inspirations for the design of Verifi.
There have been some efforts to classify and differentiate be-
tween verified and suspicious sources or to visualize specific types
of misinformation such as rumors or click-baits. It has been shown
that linguistic and stylistic features of news can be helpful in de-
termining trustworthy news sources. Moreover, focus on different
topics can be used to characterize news sources [41]. On Twitter,
social network relationships between news accounts, as well as
emotions extracted from tweets have been useful in differentiat-
ing suspicious accounts from verified sources [61]. Furthermore,
using different language attributes such as sentiment, URLs, lexicon-
based features, and N-grams models have been created that can
accurately classify rumors [31]. There are also a handful methods
or systems that aim to enable humans to interact and understand
veracity of sources or news articles. Besides the mentioned human
curated fact-checking websites, There are systems that allow users
to explore sources or (semi-) automatically detect news veracity
on social media including FactWatcher [26], Rumorlens [48], and
Hoaxy [51].
Most of these systems allow some exploration and fact-checking
on specific misinformation related factors. As a recent survey of
more than 2,000 teachers regarding the impacts of technology on
their students’ research ability shows, current technologies should
encourage individual to focus on a wide variety of factors regard-
ing sources of misinformation. Inspired by previous research in
psychology, social sciences, and computation; and In line with
recommendations that focusing on empowering individuals and
enabling them to differentiate sources are the best strategies to
battle misinformation [32], we developed Verifi2. Verifi2 employs
an exploratory visual analytic approach and utilizes a combination
of existing and new computational methods and is inspired by ex-
isting literature on misinformation, as well as a number of previous
user studies on early prototypes to understand how users interact
with misinformation [5].
3 THE DESIGN OF VERIFI2
In this section, we detail the inspirations for the Verifi2 system
design, the tasks that Verifi2 aim to support, and distinguish Verifi2
from earlier prototypes that are specifically developed for user
experiments to evaluate cognitive biases [5].
3.1 Task Characterization
Combating misinformation requires a multidisciplinary effort. On
the one hand, the data mining and NLP research communities are
producing new methods for detecting and modeling the spread of
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Figure 1: TheVerifi2 interface is designed to support the investigation ofmisinformation sources on socialmedia. The interface
consists of 5 views: A) Account view, B) Social Network view, C) Entity Cloud view, D) Word/Image Comparison view and E)
Tweet view.
misinformation [53]. On the other hand, social scientists and psy-
chologists are studying how misinformation is perceived and what
intervention strategies might be effective in mitigating them[46].
More importantly, pioneers on misinformation research have been
calling for an educational response to combating misinformation
[32, 63]. Verifi2 aims to contribute to this cause by bringing to-
gether findings from various disciplines including communications,
journalism, and computation and raise awareness about the dif-
ferent ways news accounts try to affect audiences’ judgment and
reasoning. In addition, following Lazer et al.’s recommendation
[32], Verifi2 aims to support the analysis of misinformation on the
source/account level, in contrast to investigating one news story at
a time.
Verifi2 is designed to support multiple tasks and enable users to
evaluate the veracity of accounts at scale. The tasks are partially
inspired by our comprehensive review and categorization of the
recent literature on misinformation mentioned in section 2. The list
of task are also inspired by our discussions and collaborations with
researchers that have been working on computationally modeling
misinformation. The tasks include:
• Task1: presenting and raising awareness of features that can
computationally separate misinformation and real news;
– Task1A: presenting linguistic features of news accounts
– Task1B: presenting social network features of news ac-
counts
• Task2: enabling comparison between real and suspicious
news sources;
– Task2A: presenting top mentioned entities to enable the
comparison around an entity of interest by different news
accounts
– Task2B: enabling comparison of slants in usage of image
postings and text between real and suspicious news ac-
counts
• Task3: supporting flexible analysis paths to help users reason
about misinformation by providing multiple aspects that
contribute to this complex issue.
The tasks drove the design of the Verifi2 system, including the
back-end computation and the front-end visualizations. Details of
the Verifi2 system are provided in section 4.
4 VERIFI2
In this section, we provide detailed descriptions on the computa-
tional methods, the Twitter dataset we collected for misinformation
investigation, and the visual interface. The overall system pipeline
of Verifi2 is shown in Fig. 2.
4.1 History of Verifi
Verifi2 is a product of incorporating feedback from 150+ users from
two experiments on decision-making on misinformation [5] and
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Figure 2: Verifi2 pipeline. Tweets, meta information, and images from 285 accounts are collected from Twitter streaming API.
Language features, named entities, and word embeddings are extracted from the tweets. A social network is built based on the
mention/retweet relationships. The accounts are clustered together using community detection of a bipartite account/named
entity network. Image similarities are calculated based on feature vectors. All of these analysis are stored in a database and
used for the visual interface.
a comprehensive literature review on how misinformation is pro-
duced, believed, and battled. Verifi11 was is an interface that is built
for conducting studies on cognitive biases using decision-making
tasks around misinformation. It contains a small number of masked
accounts and simple visualizations. Users would use Verifi1 to make
decisions on whether an unknown account is real or fake based
on given cues and information [5]. After conducting a thorough
literature review and further analyzing the user studies, we realized
that users are will not always have a visual analytics system at
hand to make real-world decisions. Therefore, we developed Verifi2
with a new goal: Enabling users to explore news through a visual
analytic system, learn about how news sources induce bias and
slants in their stories, and ultimately transfer this knowledge in
their real-world scenarios. However, The experiments and studies
conducted using Verifi1 highlighted important points that guide
the new features and goals of Verifi2:
• Users rely heavily on their qualitative analysis of news article
in conjunction of provided information. This result guided
us to create completely new features that support qualitative
analysis of news/context of news such as usage of visual
imagery, topic similarity, and social network communities.
• Verifi1 included a simple force directed visualization of an
undirected mention/retweet network. Even though these
networks were shown to be computationally discriminating,
they proved to be extremely misleading for some specific
cases. In Verifi2 we provide a new network visualization
with directed edges and topic communities.
1https://verifi.herokuapp.com/
• Verifi1 included a view for map visualization of place enti-
ties. This view was the least used view in Verifi1 and users
suggested it was difficult to use. In Verifi2 we replace that
view with a word-cloud visualization of the place entities.
• Verifi1 included linguistic features that proved to be vague
or hard to interpret for users. We removed those features
including non-neutral language, added new color coding
metaphors and encodings for medians and averages of each
score.
Finally, even though the design language of Verifi2 is influenced
by Verifi1, Verifi2 incorporates new features or important improve-
ments in every step within the pipeline (Figure 2), including more
social media news accounts, different language features, new al-
gorithms to support the comparison between real and suspicious
accounts, and modified visual representations compared to Verifi1.
4.2 Data
Verifi2 is designed to enable investigation of misinformation on a
source-level. Therefore, our data collection starts with identifying a
list of verified and suspicious news accounts. The list was obtained
by cross-checking three independent third-party sources and the
list has been used in prior research on identifying features that can
predict misinformation [61]. The list includes 285 news accounts
(166 real and 119 suspicious news accounts) from around the world.
We then collected tweets from these accounts between October 25th
2017 to January 25th 2018 from the public Twitter Streaming API.
As a result, more than 1million tweets were included in our analysis.
In addition to the account meta data and the tweet content, some
tweets include links to images. Since images can play an important
role in making a tweet more attractive and thus receiving more
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attention [38], we further collected all images for analysis. As a
result, all tweets, account meta data, and images were stored in our
database and were accessed using NodeJS. The tweets were then
processed through a variety of different computational methods to
support the analysis and comparison between sources of real news
and misinformation.
4.3 Data Analysis and Computational Methods
This section will describe the data analysis and computational meth-
ods used to enable users to achieve the tasks Verifi2 aims to support.
4.3.1 Data analysis to support Task 1.
SupportingTask 1A–Language use bynews accounts:Research
on misinformation and framing suggests that suspicious accounts
are likely to utilize anger or outrage-evoking language [11, 30, 55].
Verifi2 enables users to explore language use of news accounts. To
achieve this task, we characterize language use by utilizing a series
of dictionaries developed by linguists and a classification model for
predicting emotions and sentiment. We started with a broad set of
language features, including moral foundations [23, 25], subjectiv-
ity [62], and bias language [47], emotion [60], and sentiment [33]
(Fig. 2 Language Features). Each of these features consists of various
sub-features/dimensions. For example, the moral foundations in-
cludes five dimensions, namely fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal,
care/harm, authority/subversion, and purity/degradation. We ex-
tract six different emotions (fear, anger, disgust, sadness, joy, and
surprise) and three sentiment dimensions (positive, negative, and
neutral). Overall, we collected over 30 dimensions that can be used
to characterize language use. In [5], we performed a random for-
est to rank the dimensions based on their predictive power for a
news account being real or suspicious. Among all of the calculated
features, high score in fairness, loyalty, subjectivity was found to
be predictive of real news accounts and fear, anger, and negative
sentiment were found to be predictive of suspicious news accounts.
The details for all language features can be found at [5], which
presented a study leveraging Verifi1. For Verifi2, we re-examined
the language features and removed the ones participants found
confusing. As a result, six language features were included in the
Verifi2 interface.
SupportingTask 1B–Understanding relationships between
news accounts: There are multiple ways to investigate the rela-
tionships among real and suspicious news accounts on Twitter.
On the one hand, previous research [61] suggests that it is more
likely for suspicious news accounts to mention or retweet real news
accounts but not vice versa. On the other hand, literature on mis-
information and framing shows that accounts have the tendency
to focus on a subset (narrow set) of news topics compared to real
news accounts [11, 55]. To present these two important aspects,
we constructed a social network of all 285 news accounts based on
both the retweet/mention relationship and the common entities
they mention. To model the relationship among accounts based on
their entity mentions, we constructed a bipartite network with two
types of nodes: news accounts and entity mentions (people, places,
and organizations). If an account mentions an entity there would
be an edge between the two, weighted by the number of times
the account mentioning that entity. We then applied maximum
modularity community detection [43] on the bipartite network to
identify communities of news accounts.
The community detection result contains 28 communities each
with a number of accounts and entities with meaningful relation-
ships. To briefly illustrate the community detection results, we
describe three salient communities. The largest one contains 49
accounts (38 suspicious and 11 real). The top entities in this commu-
nity include Russia, ISIS Iraq, Catalonia, Putin, and Catalonia which
suggest an international focus of this community. Indeed, after ex-
amining self described locations of the accounts from their Twitter
profiles, a vast majority were from Europe, Russia, and the Middle
East. The second largest community contains 41 nodes (31 real and
10 suspicious), with top entities in the community including Amer-
icans, Congress, Democrats, Republicans, and Manhattan which
suggest a focus on American politics. Investigating the locations of
these news accounts show that almost all of these accounts are from
the United States. Another large community comprised entirely of
suspicious accounts mention entities including Muslims, Islam, Lee
Harvey Oswald, and Las Vegas which hints towards sensational
topics related mostly to the United States.
4.3.2 Data analysis to support Task 2.
NLPmethods to support Task 2A–Understanding the topmen-
tioned entities but real and suspicious news accounts: Extant
research shows that different accounts tend to have specific focus
on topics such as places and political figures. By highlighting these
entities from the text of tweets, we allow users to explore topical
features of these news accounts. By extracting three types of named
entities (people, places, and organizations) we can enable users to
both easily explore topics of interest and compare how different
accounts treat specific entities or topics. To extract named entities,
we used python SpaCy.2 After semi-automated clean up of the false
positives and negatives, we saved the results in the database along
with the tweets to be utilized in the interface.
Based on the top entities, Verifi2 further integrates computa-
tional methods to support comparing real and suspicious account
postings around the same issue. Being able to compare the key-
words usage around the same issue between real and suspicious
news accounts contributes to the understanding of how different
news media outlets frame their news. To this aim, we integrated a
word embedding model [39] in Verifi2 to present the most seman-
tically related words to entities selected interactively by an user.
We first obtained vector representations of all words in our tweet
collection using TensorFlow[6]. We then use the selected entity
as the query word and identify the top keywords by calculating
the cosine similarity between the query word and all words in the
vocabulary. We performed this process separately for real news and
suspicious news accounts. As a result, we were able to identify and
display the most semantically similar keywords to a query word
from both real news and suspicious news accounts’ postings.
Computationalmethods to support task 2B–Compare real
and suspicious account preference on images: Research on
misinformation and news framing shows that visual information
including images are used heavily to convey different biased mes-
sages without explicitly mentioning in text [7, 22, 38]. To this aim,
we utilized images from our 285 tweet accounts to enable users to
2https://spacy.io/
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compare and contrast the images posted by real and suspicious news
accounts. We use the ResNet-18 model with pre-trained weights to
extract a feature vector of 512 dimensions for every image from the
“avgpool” layer3 [27]. For any image that a user interactively selects
as the query, we identify the top 10 similar images from both real
news and suspicious news accounts measured by cosine similar-
ity. Therefore, users can compare the images with accompanying
tweets from real and suspicious accounts given an input image.
4.4 Visual Interface
Verifi2 includes a visual interface with multiple coordinate views
to support a variety of analytical tasks regarding misinformation
described in section 4.3. The interactions are designed to support
Task 3 in that it enables flexible analysis strategies to make sense
of the veracity of news accounts. The visual interface consists of
five views: Account view, Social Network view, Entity Cloud view,
Word/Image Embedding view and Tweet view. Through a series of
interactions, each view enables users to focus specific aspects of mis-
information while the rest of the views update accordingly. In this
section, we will describe the features and affordances of each view
while detailing how they are coordinated via users interactions.
4.4.1 Account View. The Account view shows tweet timeline and
language features of 285 Twitter news accounts (Fig. 1A ). Real
news accounts are underlined by green lines and suspicious news
accounts are underlined by red lines . The bar chart shows the
daily tweet count of the account of the selected time range The
six language features (fairness, loyalty, subjectivity, fear, anger and
negativity) introduced in section 4.3.1 are represented by donut
charts (scaled from 0-100). The numbers in the donut charts indicate
the ranking of each language feature per account based on its score.
For example, as seen in Fig. 1A the account @NYTimes ranks high
on fairness (34th out of 285) and loyalty (21th ) while ranking low on
anger (237th ) and negativity (270th ). Two lines in the donut chart
indicate mean (orange) and median (blue) of the language feature to
facilitate the understanding of how a particular account score given
the mean and median of all accounts. The language features are
displayed in two groups based on the correlations with the news
accounts being real or suspicious. Overall, real news accounts have
positive correlation with fairness, loyalty, and subjectivity while
suspicious news accounts have positive correlation with fear, anger,
and negativity. This view is connected to the analysis described in
section 4.3.1 and supports Task1A.
Clicking on an account name filters the data for all views to only
tweets from the selected account. Hovering the mouse over the
name of each account invokes a tooltip showing the description of
the hovered news account based on its Twitter profile. Users can
sort the accounts based on any language features and explore how
real and suspicious news accounts differ in language use.
4.4.2 Social Network View. Based on the analysis introduced in
section 4.3.1, the Social Network view present information on both
retweet/mentions between news accounts, and the news account
communities constructed based on the entities they mention (Fig.
1B). The visualization adopts a circular layout. Each node in the
view represents a news account, colored in either red (suspicious) or
3https://tinyurl.com/y9h7hex
Figure 3: Word Comparison view. The query word is “North
Korea”, the top related keywords from real news accounts
are shown on the left while the keywords from suspicious
accounts are displayed on the right.
green (real). The nodes are positioned at the perimeter of the circle.
The directed links between accounts are established by retweet and
mention, while the account communities are determined based on
entity mention. To avoid adding more colors to denote communi-
ties, we alternated a light and darker shades of gray in the nodes
background for adjacent communities to present the clusters. This
view supports Task1B.
Hovering on a node highlights all connections of the node to
other nodes by with outgoing and incoming edges. An incoming
edge represents the account is being mentioned or retweeted while
an outcoming edge represents the account retweeted or mentioned
another account. Moreover, hovering on a node shows a word cloud
of named entities related to its community. Furthermore, users can
pan and zoom in the Social Network view to switch focus between
an overview of the social network and particular communities for
analysis.
4.4.3 Entity Cloud View. The Entity Cloud view presents three
word cloud visualizations for designed for people, places and orga-
nizations respectively (Fig. 1C). Users can get a quick overview of
the top mentioned named entities by all or selected accounts. We
applied three colors - blue, purple and orange for each word cloud to
distinguish mentions of these entities. The same color assignment
is used in the Tweet view to highlight mentions of different entities
in individual tweets. The Entity Cloud view supports Task2A.
Clicking on each entity in any of these world clouds filters the
data to include tweets that contain these entities. It is important to
note that the filters in Verifi stack, in that if an account is selected,
then clicking on an entity shows tweets from that account contain-
ing that entity. Moreover, clicking on entities opens up the Word
Comparison view to enable comparison of related terms from real
and suspicious sources.
4.4.4 Word/Image Comparison View. The Word Comparison view
(Fig. 3) is visible when users clicks on an entity from the Entity
Cloud view. The view allows users to compare top 10 semantically
similar words from real (Fig. 3 left) and suspicious news accounts
(Fig. 3) right) to the selected entity. The user can find common and
distinct words from either news sources. The user can further the
comparison task by clicking on one of the semantic words. This
action filters the tweets to those that include both selected entity
and similar word. This view supports Task2A.
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Figure 4: Top: Illustrating comparison between top seman-
tically related words to the entity “GOP” (The Republican
Party). Bottom: Community of news accounts in the social
network that most mention the term GOP.
Enabled by the analysis described in section 4.3.2, the Image
Comparison view (Fig. 1D) displays the top 10 similar images from
real and suspicious news accounts given a query image. The central
image circle of this view is the query image. To the left and right
of this image are the top similar images from real and suspicious
news accounts. The size of the circle encodes the cosine similarity
value; with larger circles capturing the images being more similar.
Hovering on an image shows the enlarged image as well as the
associated tweet, account, and cosine similarity to the selected
image. Using this circular encoding, users can easily see whether
images most similar to a selected image or mostly from real news
accounts or suspicious accounts. This view supports Task2B.
4.4.5 Tweet View. The Tweet view (Fig. 1E) provides details and
allows users to read the actual tweets. This view enhances the
reading experience by highlighting mentioned entities with the
same color code as in the Entity Cloud view. The Tweet view also
shows thumbnail images if a tweet links to an image. Hovering on
an image thumbnail enlarges the hovered image for better legibility.
Clicking on an image of interest opens the Image Comparison
view to enable comparison of most similar images from real and
suspicious news accounts.
Figure 5: comparison of images/tweet pairs between real and
suspicious news shows how these groups use images differ-
ently.
5 USAGE SCENARIO: EXPLORING NEWS
RELATED TO AN ORGANIZATION
In this scenario, the user is interested in exploring the news re-
garding the political climate in the United States. After launching
Verifi2, The user starts by looking at entities in the Entity Cloud
View (Fig. 4A). She immediately observes that one of the top men-
tioned organizations is GOP. By clicking the word in the Entity
Cloud view, the interface updates to show tweets that mention GOP
in the Tweet view. At the same time, the Word Comparison view
gets activated so she can compare words most related to GOP from
either real or suspicious news accounts (Fig. 4B). She observes that
some of the closest words from real news (green colored words)
are republicans, democratic, gops, bill, senate, and reform mostly
“neutral” words that are directly related to the organization. She
also observes that the related words from suspicious accounts (red
colored words) are different. They include republican, dem, #UNS,
democrat, #savetps, and jeff_flake.
Through comparing the top related words to “GOP”, she finds
the words dem, democrat, and democrats that are not among the
top 10 words on the real news list. By clicking on the word ”dem”,
she can now cross-filter with the word “GOP” and “dems” and
see how different accounts report their stories involving the two
keywords. She finds out that the majority of the tweets that include
both keywords in the Tweet view are from suspicious accounts.
One of the tweets is a Russian account retweeting an Iranian news
account regarding a weapons ban proposal: “GOP fails to back Dems’
weapons ban proposal”. Other tweet looks extremely sensational and
opinionated: “BREAKING: Dems and GOP Traitors Unite Against Roy
Moore” and “Enraged Liberals Snap After Senate Dems Get Treated
Like Rag Dolls, Cave to GOP to End Govt...”
The user then clicks on the word “bill” from the real news list
which is not found on the misinformation list. Most of the tweets
seems to be reporting events with neutral language about different
bills: “Rauner calls transparency bill ’political manipulation,’ angering
GOP”, “Property-tax deduction could help GOP reform bill” and “GOP
leaders plan to hold votes on the bill early next week, first in the Senate
and then the House.”
Having learned from this comparison that the way suspicious
news accounts frame news about GOP might be different that real
news accounts, she continues to explore differences between ac-
counts in the Social Network view. The view highlights the ac-
counts that have used the term GOP. She notices that most of the
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Figure 6: The Image Comparison view highlights how suspicious accounts frame images to convey messages.
accounts are concentrated in one community (See Fig. 4C). The top
mentioned entities by this cluster shown in the graph include repub-
licans, congress, house, and senate which are concepts related to
American politics. After zooming into the cluster, she realizes that
even though most of the accounts in this cluster are real accounts,
there are a number of suspicious news accounts (in red). She then
clicks on one of the red accounts to investigate how that accounts
treats the GOP organization.She then goes to the Tweet view to
examine tweets from these suspicious accounts. The first tweet is
“Democrats Were Fighting for the Rich in Opposing the GOP’s 401(k)
Cut Proposal”. The tweet includes an image that shows dollar bills
and tax papers. By clicking on the image, she is able to compare the
related images from real and suspicious news accounts (Fig. 5). She
observes that all the images include pictures of money. She notices
that one real news account is using the same image. By hovering on
the images, she compares the tweets that link to these images from
real and suspicious account. One tweet from a real news account is
about tax reform: “Tax ‘reform’ could harm graduate students, delay
scientific advancement...”. She then finds another image again with
dollar bills and tax papers from a suspicious account: “More Than
Half of Total Trump-GOP Tax Plan Benefits Go to Richest 5%”. She
observes that this tweet has a suggestive tone in comparison to the
more neutral tone of the tweet containing the similar images from
real news.
6 EXPERT INTERVIEWS
Our goal with Verifi2 is to help individuals learn about the different
ways suspicious news accounts are showed to introduce slants,
biases, and falseness into their stories. Moreover, we aim to pro-
duce a system to create help users make decisions in real-world
scenarios. To assess our system on these grounds, we conducted
five semi-structured interview sessions with experts from differ-
ent disciplines who work on battling misinformation or conduct
research on misinformation. These five individuals were univer-
sity professors from education/library sciences, communications,
digital media, psychology, and political science. Naturally, each of
our interviewees had a different approach to understanding and
battling misinformation which resulted in valuable commentary on
both the features of Verifi2, as well as the potentials for it to be used
in real-world attempts to battle misinformation. The interviews
were recorded, transcribed, and analyzed.
6.1 Interview Setup
Interview sessions took between 45-60 minutes. Before showing
the interface to the interviewees, we asked them to introduce them-
selves, their professions, and their specific concern with misinfor-
mation. Next, we asked general questions about misinformation and
how technology can assist in attempts to battle it. We also inquired
our interviewees about how they differentiate between misinfor-
mation and real information, suspicious and real news sources,
and the reasons audiences chose to believe misinformation. After
the initial questions, we opened Verifi2 and started thoroughly ex-
plaining the different parts of the interface. The interviewees made
comments and asked questions regarding the features throughout
the interface walk through. Finally, we asked to important closing
questions. Namely if they thought of other features that needs to be
added to the interface, and what potential uses they see for Verifi2.
In this section, we will summarize the important lessons learned
from these interviews. Direct quotes from interviewees are slightly
edited for legibility.
6.2 Facial action coding: A psychologist’s
perspective
Biases and slants can be hidden not only in text, but also in the
images. These hidden farmings can activate our mental frames and
biases without us noticing them [22, 38]. During our interviews
with experts conducting research about misinformation, a professor
in psychology who specializes in emotion analysis made observa-
tions about the differences between real and suspicious accounts on
their usage of graphics/images. After receiving an introduction of
the interface, the psychologist started exploring the image compar-
ison feature in Verifi2. She was particularly interested in close-up
images of individuals. Given her expertise in emotion contagion, her
hypothesis was that real vs. suspicious news outlets may frame the
visual information in tweets using subtle emotional encoding. She
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focused on the facial expressions in the images used in suspicious
accounts compared to real news accounts.
Clicking on the picture of a person active in politics and ex-
amining the different top related images from real or suspicious
accounts, she said: “These [pointing at the images from suspicious
sources] are all more unattractive. you see this with [polarizing polit-
ical figures], all the time whereas these [pointing at images from real
news accounts] are not, they are all showing positive images, [. . . ]. So
these people [real news images] look, composed! these [suspicious news
images] less-so. So fake news apparently is also much more likely to
[use negative imagery].[. . . ] That’s exactly what I do. When I started
I did facial action coding. So you can actually do individual coding of
facial muscles and they correspond with particular emotions and that
is also something that you can [use the interface for]”. Fig. 6 shows
the pictures this expert was using as an example to show the way
suspicious accounts frame their images using emotional encoding.
6.3 A spectrum of trustworthiness rather than
binary classes
All of our interviewees acknowledged the challenge in defining mis-
information. As well as the complexity of the issue which involves
both news outlets with different intents, as well as audiences with
different biases. Their definitions of misinformation were different
but with some common features. They made notes on our binary
choice (real vs. suspicious) and how it is important to communicate
the complexity of misinformation and move away from a simple
binary definition thus not alienating the people who might be most
prone to the dangers of misinformation.
The expert in digital media discussed the subtlety of the of the
misinformation problem and hinted towards revisiting how we clas-
sify news accounts you have maybe a factual article, but the headline
is focusing on a particular part of that article and a kind of inflam-
matory way that actually has nothing to do with the constitution.
Our communications expert mentioned that misinformation could
be in forms other than news: : “Misinformation could be in different
settings, not just narrowly focused on news in particular, however,
[completely false news] is probably one of the most problematic forms
of misinformation because it has the potential to reach audiences”.
Two of the interviewees mentioned that the categorization of the
real vs. suspicious accounts should be within a spectrum rather than
a binary decision. Our digital media expert elaborated on this point:
“there’s a couple of websites or Twitter feeds that I’ve been following
that are really, problematic because they’re basically funded by NATO
and they’re there to track Russian misinformation and propaganda.
But the really interesting thing about it is that they’re using language
that’s very propagandistic themselves.” She then continued about
how the interface could respond to these gray areas: “maybe rather
than ascribing them [the accounts] as being real or [suspicious], they
can be scored on a continuous spectrum taking into accounts all
features in Verifi."
6.4 Verifi2 as a potential tool for education on
misinformation
Two out of five interviewees have been working on the “Digital
Polarization” project, which is part of a national program to combat
fake news 4. Therefore, educating college students about misinfor-
mation has been on the top of their minds. After walking he inter-
viewees through the usage of Verifi2, each had different thoughts
on how the interface would be useful within their tasks.
The digital media professor discussed how Verifi2 would be a
useful tool for teaching students about how to compare different
sources. However, she was concerned about alienating individuals
with different political preferences: “. . . someone may subscribe to
some fake news websites, and that’s what they think [is true]. And I
think that’s all true if you presented this to them and then they saw
that their preferred website came up as as fake information. Um, what
happens is that’ll just set their back up against a wall and they’ll be
like, well, no, this is totally wrong.”. she then continued to describe
how the interface would be useful for high school and college
students if it allowed them to come to conclusions themselves: “I
think it would be such a great tool for teaching people how to evaluate
information. I’m especially thinking of high schoolers [. . . ] I think
about some of my freshman students coming in and they’re really
good at parsing out information that’s presented visually and they
would be really good at navigating something like this and say, oh,
OK, this is leaning towards true or this is leaning towards fake..”
The political science professor emphasized the importance of
creating a tool which discourages individuals from partisan moti-
vated reasoning: “one of the most important things that your tool
would have to do is to help people disengage from a partisan motivated
reasoning or predisposition based reasoning, which is actually really
hard to do. I mean, you can cue people and try to reduce it, But we
have an inherent tendency to shore up our existing beliefs, but a tool
that, that somehow gets people to think about things in atypical ways
[would be really beneficial]”
There was also a discussion of using Verifi2 as an assignment
for students through which they would apply their knowledge in
media literacy to decide whether accounts are trustworthy or not.
The education expert described this and how Verifi2 can be applied
in a number of different educational settings: “ I’m thinking for a
student assignment, we could [for example] pick 5 reliable sources and
5 unreliable ones. [. . . ] I could even see this potentially being useful
not just in these targeted classes [that we teach] but in some of the
liberal studies courses, that are more Gen ed requirements. I can see
this, depending on the right instructor, if we knew about this tool that
could educate people about [misinformation], they could be developing
assignments for their writing classes or inquiry assignments. Overall,
I see a lot of potential.”
Our expert interviews highlight the potentials for Verifi2 to be
used in scenarios where experts educate individuals about differ-
ences between real and suspicious sources of news. However, they
highlighted the delicacy required to take on the complicated task of
educating younger individuals on these concepts. Their recommen-
dations included simpler interface and allowing users to decide the
trustworthiness of the accounts based on their own assessment.
7 DISCUSSION
The final design of Verifi2 is inspired by three threads of research
and experiments: data mining and NLP, social sciences, and direct
4http://www.aascu.org/AcademicAffairs/ADP/DigiPo/
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user feedback from prior research on decision-making on misin-
formation [5]. With this in mind, Verifi2 supports calls to address
misinformation from a multidisciplinary approach [32]. To evaluate
our system, we interviewed experts from multiple disciplines who
focus on the problem of misinformation, each who provided differ-
ent feedback. First, when we are dealing with the ever-increasing
but complex topic of misinformation, we need to pay attention
to the different types of misinformation as well as the intents of
such producers of misinformation. Additional consideration must
be made as well on the vulnerabilities and biases of consumers
of information. To better deal with this issue, our interviewees
recommended allowing users to make modifications on the sys-
tems encoding on suspicious or real accounts based on the many
qualitative and quantitative evidence available through the system.
In addition, they emphasized the importance of moving from a
binary representation of accounts (real vs. suspicious) to a spec-
trum. One solution to both these suggestions is to enable human
annotations (e.g., adjust binary classifications). By allowing users
to annotate, we will increase user trust. Human annotations will be
critical for accurate and updated results. Our current data is based
on third-party lists that, while are good proxies, may change over
time. Human annotation could become critical to validate, filter,
and override. Combined with Visual interactive labeling (VIL) like
CHISSL [10], human annotators could provide real-time feedback
on the accounts (e.g., cognitive psychologists who label extreme
emotions).
Like many other researchers, our interviewees struggle with
how to educate individuals on the spread of misinformation. They
mentioned that Verifi would be a very useful tool to enhance tra-
ditional strategies such as media literacy courses. However, their
responses made apparent the fact that the task of educating in-
dividuals requires much more work and rigor. It was mentioned
that some simplifications and proper training needs to be done in
order to make Verifi2 ready for education, especially for younger
audiences. We are working with the researchers to modify, clarify,
and prepare Verifi2 for such educational applications. Moreover,
different educational settings require slightly different modifica-
tions. These modifications include enabling Verifi2 to focus only on
a subset of the accounts or to enable users to observe completely
new accounts, creating an infrastructure for Verifi2 to be used as
course assignments, and partnering with educational institutions
to deploy Verifi2.
8 CONCLUSION
While not a new phenomenon, misinformation as an application
of study is in its infancy [31]. In such an environment, visual ana-
lytics can play a critical role in connecting across disciplines [32].
In this paper, we introduced the Verifi2 system that allows users
to approach misinformation through text, social network, images,
and language features. We described case studies to show some
of the ways users can utilize Verifi2 to understand sources of mis-
information. Finally, we interviewed a diverse set of experts who
commonly focused onmisinformation, but had different approaches.
We learned that Verifi2 can be highly useful to be deployed as an
educational tool. But most importantly, we learned that Visual An-
alytics can be an extremely useful tool to battle misinformation.
This, however, requires more work and a common goal from the
visualization community to address the complexities of such issues.
We call for visualization researchers to take on this task, to make
our democracies more resilient to the harms of misinformation.
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